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ASEAN and Major Powers: Japan and China – A Changing Balance 
of Power?1 
Frank Umbach  
1. Introduction 
“The post-Cold War ASEAN is an ASEAN that can say ‘no’. They can say ‘no’ to China, being willing to 
engage in ‘informal’ diplomacy with Taiwan. They can say ‘no’ to Japan on matters of Japanese interests 
outside of ASEAN. They most definitely can say ‘no’ to the United States on a wide range of matters.” 
(Donald E. Weatherbee in 19952) 
“In the final analysis, ASEAN countries recognise that their security, both at home and in the region, de-
pends on a pluralism of power. In regional terms, ASEAN needs both great powers (China and the US) to 
be present in the region. ASEAN needs the US presence to maintain a balance between the great powers 
in the region, and ASEAN also would like to have China incorporated in the region in cooperative secu-
rity arrangements.” 
(Thus the respected Indonesian expert Jusuf Wanandi in an article in 19963) 
The Asia-Pacific region is currently undergoing a period of tremendous political and socio-
economic change whose impact is felt at both regional and global level.4 Both perspectives of 
economic prosperity and security challenges are characterised by rapid and dynamic changes. 
While ASEAN has so far defused rather than resolved intra-regional disputes and potential 
conflicts, it is generally agreed that the ASEAN sub-region has developed into an emerging 
security community.5 Some observers and experts have described these trends as the “Asiani-
zation of Asia”.6 By celebrating its 30th birthday in 1997, ASEAN has expanded its member-
ship and assumed new responsibilities. Simultaneously, however, ASEAN is facing new chal-
lenges to its political cohesion and domestic stability in the wake of the financial and socio-
economic crisis. The haze clouding the region in 1997 and 1998 seemed to symbolise 
ASEAN’s inability to address the new security challenges and to forge joint solutions. The 
crisis tested the ability of the political elite within the ASEAN member states to set aside tra-
ditional ASEAN approaches of politness and to come up with joint measures to tackle an en-
                                                 
1 This analysis is based on the findings of my former research project ‘Perspectives of Regional Security 
Cooperation in Asia-Pacific’, sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation.  
2  Weatherbee (1995: 4). 
3  Wanandi (1996: 127). 
4  To the global implications see Kaiser (1996). 
5  To the evolution of ASEAN see Dosch (1997), Archarya (1993) and Rüland (1995). 
6  See, for instance, Funabashi (1993) and Yong Deng (1998: 86-110). 
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vironmental problem that transcends national boundaries. Furthermore, when Second Prime 
Minister Hun Sen violently ousted his rival, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh 
in early July 1997, contradictory statements about what mediation role he might accept from 
ASEAN and what kind of mediation would not violate ASEAN’s primary principle of “non-
intervention” in the internal affairs of other countries indicated the considerable inability of 
the old political elite to come to terms with the new challenges to the 21st century which de-
mands joint, regional-wide answers to globalisation trends. ASEAN’s rather tough stance to-
ward
 Hun Sen by postponing Cambodia’s admission to ASEAN as a fully-fledged member 
did not solve the deeper roots of the lack of political cohesion. Furthermore, its official invita-
tion to Burma to join as a fully-fledged member was officially justified by an effort to coun-
terbalance Chinese influence in Rangoon, but produced ongoing political friction with the 
U.S., the EU and to some extent even Japan. In sum, the balance of power seemed to tip in 
China’s favour at the expense of ASEAN.  
The last ASEAN two-day annual summit meeting on December 15-16, 1998 was sympto-
matic of that lack of unity.7 By becoming increasingly inward-looking and divided between 
the closed, conservative societies of Burma, Laos and Vietnam and the more open political 
cultures of the six original member states, ASEAN disputed the admission of Cambodia and 
Thailand’s proposed “more flexible engagement between member states” (to replace the hal-
lowed concept of of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states) and tried to find 
joint strategies for coping with the continuing socio-economic and political crisis. While in 
the economic realm at least, some progress towards implementation of an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area and to provide incentives for investors over the next two years for accelerating economic 
and financial reforms have being made during the annual summit, a consensus on important 
political issues could not be achieved.8 For the time being the stipulation of the “new Pacific 
century” seems to have been postponed. 
So far, the security landscape of Asia-Pacific has been determined in large by the major 
powers – the United States, Russia, China and Japan. Presently, East Asia9 and its member 
states are all in the process of (re-)adjusting their security alignments. The end of the Cold 
War and the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the reduction of the U.S. military presence 
in the region, have also left a political vacuum in East Asia that has created a “window of 
strategic opportunity” The roles of the United States, Japan, China, both Korean states, 
Taiwan and the ASEAN countries are changing in accordance with the fluid environment and 
“new uncertainties”. These “new uncertainties” – as the Asian financial crisis has 
demonstrated – are primarily the result of rapidly changing internal and external factors.  
The transformation of political systems and entire societies to cope successfully with the 
new political, social and economic challenges has always been critical in history as we can 
                                                 
7  See also China News (18 December 1998: 5) and Vatikiotis (1998). 
8  See China News (17 December 1998: 5). 
9  The term ‘East Asia’ here in this chapter denotes the region comprising both North and Southeast Asia. 
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now see yet again not only in the example of the former communist and socialist countries in 
Europe. In this regard, the ASEAN states are no exception nor are the major powers in East 
Asia themselves, namely China and Japan. Stable external relations with these major and re-
gional powers are an important factor for the future prosperity of the ASEAN states.  
The future roles, missions and challenges within the specific triangular relationship among 
the United States, China and Japan have particularly created tension and uncertainties in Asia-
Pacific, aggravated by domestic challenges, unresolved territorial conflicts, an arms build-up 
and proliferation challenges that have the potential to destabilise the entire region.10 The evo-
lution of ASEAN’s multilateral economic cooperation and security institutions including with 
external powers in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) might still depend on whether or not the three major powers can produce a sta-
ble and cooperative relationship.  
The following chapters will try to summarise the internal and external factors shaping 
ASEAN’s relations with the two major East Asian powers in the region, namely China and 
Japan.11 Although they cover both the economic and political dimensions of ASEAN’s exter-
nal relations with these two powers, this paper will focus primarily on foreign policy, security 
issues and strategic considerations. Moreover, this paper will also draw conclusions for the 
strategic perspectives of ASEAN’s rather new multilateral security institution, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), and the question of its ability for conflict resolution within the Asia-
Pacific. Analysing China’s policy vis-à-vis ASEAN, special focus will be directed on Bei-
jing’s South China Sea policy as a case study and important indicator for the management of 
future relations in the Asia-Pacific region.12 
2. Between Bandwagoning and Balancing? – ASEAN’s Ambivalent Rela-
tionship to China 
China’s relationship with Southeast Asia goes back almost 2,000 years. In the eigth century 
B.C., the Chinese began to fashion a concept of a “Middle Kingdom” superior to all other sur-
rounding countries. More recently, the relationship between the ASEAN states and China has 
historically been burdened by China’s involvement in a number of abortive coups by support-
ing local communist insurgents and by trying to use the so-called “overseas” Chinese as a 
fifth column for its own political ends in order to increase its leverage by interfering in inter-
nal affairs of ASEAN states. It was only in the 1970s that most of the ASEAN states started to 
establish diplomatic relations with Beijing. At the beginning of the 1990s, the relationship 
between ASEAN and China became easier. In contrast to the United States and Europe, 
                                                 
10  See Anggoro (1998), Umbach (1998e, 1999a, 1999b and 1999c). 
11  To a former analysis at the beginning of this decade see Parrenas (1990). 
12  See also in this context Snyder (1997). 
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ASEAN countries – with the notable exception of Singapore (besides Japan the only country 
in Asia) – neither criticised China for the Tiananmen killings in 1989 nor did they impose 
sanctions. Beginning in 1991, ASEAN invited China as a guest of the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings (AMM). Later in 1994, China became a consultative partner of the newly created 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and finally, in 1996, a dialogue partner of the ARF. Nonethe-
less, new problems and tension have arisen between ASEAN and China that might once again 
complicate this future relationship between a rising great power and its smaller regional 
neighbors. 
Although the ASEAN countries have become increasingly accomodated with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Cold War period since 1992, the nature of ASEAN's 
relationship to China remains ambivalent13, which has direct implications on ASEAN’s rela-
tions with the other two major powers in Asia-Pacific: Japan and the United States. While 
most of ASEAN’s policies towards China are guided by the economic perspectives of a huge 
Chinese market (the World Bank has also rushed to conclusions that China’s economy will 
surpass the United States by 2020 in terms of total output and total purchasing power14), ex-
plaining ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” strategy towards China, Beijing’s ambiguous 
foreign and security policies are simultaneously a major concern in the region. The rapid 
modernisation programs of China’s armed forces (including its nuclear arsenal)15, Beijing’s 
territorial claims in the entire South China Sea and its “gunboat-policies” towards Taiwan 
have raised widespread concern over irredentist tendencies in China’s foreign and security 
agenda. Beijing’s policy to underpin these territorial claims with concrete political and mili-
tary steps as well as the assertive nature of its Taiwan policy which does not exclude the use 
of force achieving political objectives have alarmed even those parts of ASEAN’s political 
elite that have always favoured close relations to China. At the same time, ASEAN states and 
China, all in a similar critical stage of political and socio-economic transformation, are com-
peting in world markets as well as for foreign investment. Nonetheless, China’s bilateral trade 
with the ASEAN-6 increased at an annual rate of over 20 per cent to almost $19 billion in 
1995 with a 41,8 per cent increase over the amount of 13 billion in 1994. In total, 3 per cent of 
China’s exports go to Southeast Asia and 7 per cent of ASEAN’s exports go to China. In do-
ing so ASEAN as a region has replaced Taiwan as China’s fifth largest trading partner.16 In 
1995-96, the annual bilateral trade increased by further 50 per cent.17 
 
 
                                                 
13  See Whiting (1997: 301) and see also Lee Lai To (1997). 
14  See The Korea Herald (henceforth TKH), (23 April 1997: 7). 
15  See Umbach (1998b: 31 and 2000a).  
16  See Yong Deng (1998: 23f.) and TKH (16 December 1997: 12). 
17  See Klintworth (1997: 24f.). 
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In regard to the regional military, all Southeast Asian armed forces have only very limited 
power projection capabilities balance despite their own military modernisation programs by 
incorporating high-tech weaponry and developing indigenous defence industries in recent 
years. China’s armed forces as the “next superpower”, have by constrast, so far faced no cuts 
due to the relative economic stability. In this light, the pace of China’s military reforms and 
modernisation contributes to the security perception of a looming Chinese threat that might 
come true for its neighbors much earlier than previously assumed.18 
The handover of Hongkong to China in 1997 revealed the ambiguity of ASEAN’s rela-
tionship to China. Whilst on the one hand, ASEAN governments have seen in the return of 
Hong Kong an unique opportunity to gain access to mainland markets and promote their eco-
nomic interests for a number of economic, political, social and strategic reasons (in contrast to 
Europe and the United States which remained critical to China’s interpretation of the “one 
country, two systems” policy), on the other hand they have simultaneously perceived a resur-
gent China which could become the region’s new imperial power. In their view, China’s sov-
ereignty claims in the South China Sea and the way that Beijing is pursuing its strategic goals 
– peacefully and benign or violently and assertive – are the litmus test for ASEAN’s future 
relationship to China and a crucial factor for regional stability in East Asia. While the policies 
of ASEAN’s member states towards China differ to some extent, all agree in generally that 
ASEAN’s solidarity requires a common opposition to any use of force by the PRC. 
2.1 “Calculated Ambiguity” – A Recipe for Potential Desaster? The Spratly-
Islands and China’s Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea as a Litmus 
Test for Its Peaceful Intentions and Sincerity 
China claims almost all islands in the South China Sea which would make the “Middle King-
dom” a near neighbor of most of the other countries in the region. These claims increase the 
Chinese jurisdiction from 370,000 km2 to approximately 3 million km2. Meanwhile, it has       
occupied the most important outermost points in the South China Sea, thus covering that 
claimed area.19 The most complex and potentially most dangerous territorial dispute concerns 
the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea. The Paracel islands comprise a mere 
130 barren islands. After seizing a portion of the Paracels occupied by South Vietnam in 
1974, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) constructed a 2,700-meter airstrip on         
Woody Island, from which aircraft can to some extent control and attack areas as far south as 
the Spratlys. Since that time it rejected competing claims by Vietnam and Taiwan. Both is-
lands are disputed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China, 
                                                 
18  To the impacts of the financial and currency crisis upon the armed forces and their procurement programs 
in East Asia see Umbach (1998c and 1998d). 
19  See Leifer (1995) and also Ching (1999). 
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Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the whole group of islands, the Philippines almost all of it, and 
Malaysia a small portion of the southern part.  
The most dangerous dimension of this potential conflict, however, are the claims of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Spratly Islands. During the Taiwan crisis from 1995-
96 and being unimpressed by the presence of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, Beijing 
signaled the U.S. Navy to keep out of the Taiwan Strait, which is about 180 kilometers (115 
miles) across and separates Taiwan from China’s Fujian Province. It reaffirmed its claim of 
the area as “Chinese waters”. Shortly after the Taiwan crisis, on 15 May 1996, the Beijing 
government again unveiled a map which extended China’s territorial claims in the South 
China Sea by over a million square miles – a sevenfold expansion of its maritime sovereignty. 
But free passages such as the Taiwan Strait and maintaining the status of international waters 
are important prerequisites for regional security and the stabilising mission of the U.S. Navy 
to guarantee open Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). The United States warned China 
that it will not accept a formal Chinese declaration which would restrict freedom of movement 
of U.S. warships and military aircraft in the South China Sea.20 Other Asian states such as 
Japan also have a strong interest in the stability of the entire area because any disruption of 
commerce would be felt immediately throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Although Japan has 
renounced any claims it may have had over the Spratly Islands, it has vital security interest in 
free sea lanes and thus in the status quo because about 75 per cent of its energy imports and 
much of its merchant shipping passes through the South China Sea. Moreover, the involve-
ment of Japanese oil companies in the Spratlys represents another important factor determin-
ing Japanese security interest of stability in the South China Sea.21 
In the official view of the PRC and in striking contrast to the other claimant states since 
the passing, on 25 February 1992, of its Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territo-  
rial Sea, however, there is no dispute because they belong historically and legally to China. In 
doing so China shocked the ASEAN-states and Japan by declaring de facto the Senkaku-
Islands and almost all territories of the South China Sea to be within its sovereign waters ig-
noring the claims of other states. Beijing has
 
also stated that it would defend its claims of the 
disputed islands by force as it did in 1988 when the Chinese Navy seized six islands of the 
Spratlys and sank two Vietnamese naval boats. It was no coincidence that the new form of the 
Chinese assertiveness came just after the United States announced its withdrawal from the 
Philippines. Thereupon, ASEAN felt forced to announce an unprecedented statement 
(ASEAN’s 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea) in urging the peaceful settle-
                                                 
20  See Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune (henceforth IHT), (19 September 1996: 4). 
21  Moreover, historically, Japan occupied the Spratly islands and surrounding reefs in 1939. The Japanese 
imperial navy used one of the islands, Taiping Dao, as a submarine base in the World War II. At the San 
Francisco conference in 1951, Japan renounced all claims to the Spratlys, but it never resolved the ow-
nership of the islands. To direct and indirect Japanese interests at the Spratlys  – see Sato (1995). 
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ment of disputed territorial claims and the need to cooperate in order to ensure the safety of 
maritime navigation and communication as well as other forms of security cooperation.22  
Disregarding ASEAN’s appeal in 1992 for a peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, 
China early in 1995 seized the Mischief Reef  lying about 150 miles west of the Philippine 
islands of Palawan. As a consequence, the situation deteriorated and escalated between China 
and the Philippines. The subsequent arrest of fishermen and the destruction of markers by the 
Philippines heightened the tension between both states. While the Philippines opted for nego-
tiations and accepted international law, China seemed not to consider itself bound by the Ma-
nila Declaration of 1992. The Korean expert Shee Poon Kim saw in the Chinese step a “new 
chapter in China’s return to its strategic presence in the Spratly Islands and the South China 
Sea, in particular, and in Southeast Asia, in general.”23 In his view: 
“... the occupation of Mischief Reef was not merely a dispute over sovereignty with the Philiipines, but 
rather a manifestation of China’s larger concern for its political and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific 
region in the face of its strategic challenges of the twenty-first century. In other words, China has a longer 
term strategic perspective in mind when dealing with its adversaries in the Spratly sovereignty dispute. 
From the historical perspective, China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea is merely a return 
to a familiar area which has been perceived as its natural sphere of interest and influence.”24 
“In this sense, the occupation of Mischief Reef was not a surprise but a rationally calculated move byBei- 
jing, and indeed a manifestation of China’s growing nationalism, economic power and confidence.”25 
China’s occupation shocked not only the Philippines, but also other ASEAN members. Ma-   
laysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, in particular, was confused because he and his 
government had repeatedly dismissed any ‘China threat’ until 1995. China’s missile firings 
and manoeuvres during the Taiwan crisis further surprised Malaysian officials who had advo-
cated the cultivation of close relations to China. Ultimately, it questioned the ability of the 
Malaysian prime minister of an adequate net assessment of the new strategic reality in post-
Cold War East Asia. 
China’s “historical claims” and its militaristic policy towards Taiwan have also raised ten-
sion and mistrust in Indonesia. Since China in 1993 published a map showing its historical 
claims, Indonesia – which often went farthest to accomodate Beijing – has begun to feel 
threatened by the Chinese claims which now included the natural gas-rich Natuna Islands. 
These islands are one of the world largest offshore gas fields and contain an estimated 1.27 
trillion cubic metres of recoverable gas – approximately 40 per cent of all Indonesia’s gas re-
serves.26 Since that time, some Indonesian security experts have recommended adopting a 
‘more realistic’ China policy and getting tougher towards Beijing. In their view, the initiated 
                                                 
22  See ASEAN (1992). 
23  Shee Poon Kim (1998: 371). 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. (382f.). 
26  Dupont (1996b: 289). 
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“constructive engagement policy” towards China should be replaced by a strategy of “en-
gagement with assertiveness”.27 Dewi Anwar Fortuna, another leading foreign and security 
expert on Indonesia, at the same time: “... I think it would be foolish for us to be completely 
naive. ... China respects strength. If they see you as being weak, they’ll eat you alive.”28 
Those voices of the younger generation in the ASEAN states provide an often striking contrast 
to the official and semi-official statements of the current elite.29 
Whilst the adequate political response to the Chinese claims continues to be disputed 
among Indonesian foreign policy experts (as is the case in other ASEAN countries), Jakarta 
reacted by announcing its intention to increase military air patrols in the region and to encour-
age people to resettle on Natuna Islands. It has also quietly urged the United States to 
strengthen its engagement in the conflicts. Furthermore, in the summer of 1996, Indonesia 
initiated its largest air, land and naval manoeuvres, including amphibious assaults and air-
borne landing, with more than 19,000 servicemen, 50 warships and 40 combat aircrafts on the 
Natuna islands to demonstrate the will to defend its sovereignty of the islands.30 A proposed 
law extands the country’s sovereignty over some 5.8 million square kilometers of land and 
waters.31 At the same time, a review of the country’s maritime security resulted in the estab-
lishment of a new National Maritime Council to formulate policies on the preservation and 
protection of the seas and its more than 17.000 islands stretching for 5,120 kilometers along 
the Equator.  
Given the fact that the Indonesian navy is still a primarily coastal defense force, Indonesia 
finally felt forced to widen and deepen its security and defense ties with Australia and the 
United States. It is now in the process of opening its waters more widely for free passage of 
foreign warships, including submarines.32 In the light of Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the 
South China Sea, its unprecedented bilateral security agreement with Australia, reached in 
December 199533, was a logical conclusion in order to prepare “for a possible military con-
frontation with [mainland] China”, as Juwona Sudarsono, a leading strategic thinker in Indo-
nesia, has indicated.34  
Although China has faced increasing political and diplomatic resistance from the 
neighboring ASEAN countries and is, indeed, risking to become isolated, by maintaining a 
                                                 
27  Sukma (1996). 
28  Quoted follwing an article by Michael Richardson, IHT (25 November 1996: VII). 
29  Jusuf Wanandi, for instance, has recommended: „ ... Thus the Asia-Pacific should accomodate and encou-
rage China to get its policies right. Containment or confrontation of China would be the wrong policy at 
this stage. ... If China were to establish itself as a revolutionary power, unwilling to abide by the rules (re-
gional or global), there would still be time for the region and the international community to take the ne-
cessary steps to ease the situation“ – see Wanandi (1996: 125). 
30  See Mc Beth (1996). 
31  See ‘Indonesian Parliament Endorses Law on Territorial Waters’ (1996). 
32  See Michael Richardson, IHT, (16 May 1996: 4). 
33  To the agreement see Dupont (1996a). 
34  Quoted following Seth (1996). 
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kind of      “salami-tactic” and by playing chess with its neighbors – one offensive move for-
ward to bolster its territorial claims and then waiting on a counterreaction, thereby hoping to 
stimulate divisons among the ASEAN states.  
In the spring of 1997, Beijing yet again raised the stakes by conducting oil and gas explo-
ration drilling off central Vietnam in waters claimed by Hanoi. Since the “asymmetrical nor-
malisation process” between Vietnam and China in 1991, China violated Vietnamese territo-
rial waters at least nine times in the years prior to 1997.35 But in contrast to previous years 
when Vietnam was still isolated in the region, the Chinese tactic had backfired. Vietnam re-
ceived significant political and diplomatic support from its fellow members of ASEAN and by 
proposing open discussions on a possible military relationship with the United States – a 
nightmare for China, which is fearing a U.S. military containment in the region. An ASEAN-
diplomat stated:
 
“Automatically ASEAN will support Vietnam. It’s all for one and one for 
all.”36 Nonetheless, ASEAN seemed largely to follow Beijing’s insistence on bilateral nego-
tiations for solving territorial disputes. On the other hand, ASEAN became more suspicious of 
China’s offer for “joint development” of disputed areas. They saw them “less as a genuinely 
conciliatory suggestion and more as a Chinese ploy to gain a foothold in areas claimed by the 
People’s Republic” as Tim Huxley has argued.37 
Though the ASEAN states often seem to accomodate rather than to confront China’s stra-
tegic power, they had seen Beijing’s exploration vessel drill as yet another litmus test which 
forced them to react.38 Finally, the repeated calls on China to withdraw the oil exploration 
vessel mounted in a diplomatic defeat for Beijing that further damaged its international image. 
But the incident also underlined the fragility of the “constructive engagement” policy of the 
ASEAN states towards China39 and explains Beijing’s interest in solving any territorial dis-
pute bilaterally rather than in multilateral forums. Moreover, it was again an open setback to 
the ARF’s efforts to engage China, particulary over those kinds of conflicts. Even the Philip-
pines, militarily the weakest ASEAN state and engaged in a dispute with China over the 
Spratly islands and the Scarborough shoal in the Macclesfield Bank in the South China Sea, 
announced a comprehensive military modernisation program after new clashes with Chinese 
vessels violating its waters several times in the beginning of 1997.40 A Chinese sponsored and 
promoting goodwill tour of a group of fellow amateur radio hobbyists, carried by the Chinese 
State Oceanic Administration to reach the Scarborough Shoal which is claimed by China and 
the Philippines, provoked another conflict in the early summer of 1997. Reportedly, the Chi-
nese government paid “ten of thousands of dollars” for the boat charter. For the Philippines, it     
                                                 
35  See Ba (1997: 640f.). 
36  Quoted following TKH (25 March 1997: 5). 
37  Huxley (1998: 116). 
38  See also ‘Drawn to the Fray‘. 
39  See Jeremy Grant, Financial Times (henceforth FT), (5-6 April 1997: 3). 
40  See also the Asian Defence Journal (henceforth ADJ), (3/1997: 71). 
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looked like a deliberate strategy by China using non-military means to reinforce its territorial 
claims and to test the political will of Manila.41 
While all territorial claimants in the South China Sea have stated their preference for 
peaceful solutions and negotiations, China seems to stick to the military solution to the territo-
rial problems open. Arguments by Western experts that dismiss China’s sovereignty claims 
and corresponding military options (because occupied islands are presently not defendable for 
the Chinese armed forces and would confront Beijing with severe logistical problems) over-
look the fact that China is a growing nuclear power and that the ASEAN states as well as Ja-
pan, Taiwan and others currently lack sufficient amphibious forces capable of regaining occu-
pied islands. The United States alone has thus far sufficient and effective amphibious forces to 
conquer defended islands in the South China Sea. But such a military option is, not only for 
China, a high risk game for both political and military reasons.42 Thus the continued reliance 
on aircraft carriers and their, for instance, Aegis equipped surface escort ships is rather un-
suited to and militarily dangerous for littoral conflicts in the Taiwan Strait or the South China 
Sea.43 Ultimately, what matters in this regard is primarily security perceptions and expecta-
tions rather than any well-balanced analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the claimant 
states. Military history, including China’s, is full of examples of weaker military forces that 
defeating much stronger military rivals. Circumstances, pre-conditions, motivation and par-
ticularly a superior strategy have often been more important than numbers. 
Whether the United States would be really willing to take such a risk for a few uninhabited 
islands in the South China Sea, is indeed the crucial question for ASEAN’s security experts. It 
explained ASEAN’s newly defined defence policies and military doctrines prior to the out-
break of Asia’s financial crisis in 1997, which were based increasingly on such a scenario and 
which determined its planned acquisitions of new state-of-the-art weapons systems.44  
Although China verbally agreed in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) not to change the 
status quo in the South China Sea through unilateral steps alone and, instead, to seek a peace-
ful solution through negotiations, China has continued to test the political will of Vietnam and 
the Philippines as well as their support within ASEAN. In August 1995, the Philippines and 
China agreed on a code of conduct to avoid any direct confrontations over the Spratly is-
lands45 which had been signed in November 1995. 46 However, the Taiwanese expert
 Peter 
Kien-hong Yu, reminded the international community and particularly the ASEAN states in 
1997 of China’s “dialectical games” in its foreign and security policies. Despite the new mul-
tilateral security discussions and confidence building measures initiated in 1994 in the frame-
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work of the ARF and CSCAP processes, in his view, China has not given up its claims of al-
most the entire South China Sea: 
 “If things proceed smoothly according to it terms, the PRC will agree to jointly develop the organic and 
mineral resources in the South China Sea with each of the regional governments. After those resources 
have been depleted, and in the event further negotiations fail, Peking would likely turn to the military op-
tion to back its territorial claims. The strategy of unilateralism would once again be revived. In sum, Pe-
king’s behavior will continue to be unpredictable. It will fluctuate between the two extremes.”47 
Moreover, despite an emerging solidarity within ASEAN when China tested the political will 
of the organisation in 1995 and 1997, China’s efforts to pursue its strategy “at limiting alli-
ances forming against them have been remarkably successful, particularly during the period 
they needed this success most: in establishing a physical presence in the Spratlys and gaining 
some recognition of the ligitimacy of China’s sovereignty”.48 And indeed, they have rather 
successfully frustrated numerous attempts by some ASEAN states to internationalise the dis-
pute, thereby insisting only on bilateral negotiations which provide Beijing with considerable 
strategic advantage of manoeuvre over its much weaker opponents. 
China’s more recent policies in the South China Sea have confirmed that China appears to 
follow a dual strategy of a “creeping occupation” to create faits of accomplis in the South 
China Sea and diplomatic appeasement vis-à-vis ASEAN. In mid-April 1998, three Chinese 
ships provocatively anchored in the vicinity of a Vietnamese-garrisoned area of the Spratlys. 
In August last year, the Philippine Air Force discovered four Chinese ships anchored near the 
Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal. It prompted a rapid response by the U.S. Navy and 
Philippine naval vessels in a live firing exercise near the shoal.49  
On 28 October 1998, aerial imagery of the Philippine Air Forces have shown that China    
recently completed new structures on the Mischief Reef, which is much closer to the Philip-
pines than to China. They include fortified three storey-buildings, a new pier, an observation 
post, a military command centre, gun emplacements and radar facilities. The constructions   
had been guarded by Chinese naval ships and anti-aircraft artillery. Additionally, it should        
include a military air strip (helipad). The new facilities look like fortifications, similar, but 
larger to those they have in the Chigua and Fiery Cross reefs.50 In the view of almost all the 
other North and South East Asian states, this represents a clear violation of the previously 
agreed status quo. The irresponsible and intimidating action has thus further undermined 
ASEAN’s approaches for confidence building and regional security within the ARF and 
CSCAP activities. As the Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon declares: “We told 
them to leave Mischief; they said no. We asked them if they’d be willing to have the dispute 
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settled through international arbitration. They said no. We told them if they’d be willing to 
have a joint-development arrangement for Mischief. They said they’ll think about it.”51 
In response, the Philippine armed forces were ordered by President Joseph Estrada to 
boost its presence in the region with the deployment of additional vessels and reconnaissance 
aircraft. Reportedly, a major deployment of Philippine marines to Palawan and the Spratlys 
was also being prepared.52 Moreover, they detained 20 Chinese fishermen near the reef. 
Thereupon, China warned the Philippines not to escalate the tension and to release the fisher-
men and the six impounded fishing vessels. Beijing insisted anew on the “indisputable sover-
eignty over the islands and the seas around them.”53 Being unable to confront China militar-
ily and to do much about the situation except to continue talking with Beijing and trying to get 
international opinion on its side, the Philippine President Joseph Estrada pushed the January 
1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the U.S. through the ratification process of the 
Senate which would also enable the Philippine armed forces to conduct joint large-scale exer-
cises with the U.S. forces on Philippine soil and in the region.54 Although China has promised 
not to build new structures in the
 Spratly islands, new “renovations” (so the Chinese justifica-
tion) cannot be excluded as Beijing’s behavior has shown. Though China has repeatedly of-
fered “joint development, including fisheries development and exploitation on equal sharing 
basis”55, those proposals are dependent upon the willingness of the Philippine side to accept 
China’s territorial sovereignty over the Spratly islands.  
Even more important for Beijing’s strategy of a “calculated ambiguity” was the timing of 
China’s renewed aggressiveness.56 As it had done on several occasions in the past, China con-
sistently moved to reinforce its claims in the South China Sea at times and towards those 
counter-claimants when they were weak. Many security specialists in the region have inter-
preted China’s behaviour as another indicator for how much the balance of power and influ-
ence has shifted to China since the onset of the region’s economic crisis, which have weak-
ened ASEAN economically, militarily as well as politically. Furthermore, the construction 
was built just before the APEC conference (taking place on 17 November) at which China 
pledged funding for ailing Asian economies and the ASEAN December summit in Hanoi 
whose both agendas had already been agreed. Given that fact and their attention being occu-
pied by the severe socio-economic and political crisis at home, the Philippines could not mo-
bilise the official strong political support of its ASEAN brethren like in 1995 and 1997.57 
Once again, China’s provocative policy in regard to the Spratly islands has thus revealed the 
increasing asymmetric power relationship between China and the other five claimant states. 
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Conse-quently, the result has been a pattern of opportunistic and sometimes aggressive Chi-
nese behaviour58 which is also demonstrated by building Chinese satellite relay stations in the 
spring of 1998 on a group of islands over which Vietnam also claims sovereignty.59 
The failing support by its ASEAN brethren, even more than China’s provocative behav-
iour itself, might have significant long-term security implications for ASEAN and the stability 
in the region. Kowtowing to China’s increasing assertiveness might indeed only encourage 
more dangerous behaviour. Lacking any understanding of strategic thinking, ASEAN’s Secre-
tary-General Rodolfo Severino stated as an excuse: “We have bigger problems to deal with, 
particularly the economy.”60 In this light, ASEAN, being unable to combine in defence of 
their interests, failed miserably. As Ralph A. Cossa has put it: “The message to China is that 
further expansion will not be seriously protested, much less contested. This is a recipe for 
potential disaster.”61 Indeed, in the light of “preventive diplomacy”, ASEAN’s failure to 
confront China might rather increase the prospects for further miscalculation on both sides. In 
this regard, China’s ongoing provocative behaviour and future Philippine or Vietnamese 
counter- or overreactions are an “accident waiting to happen”. It might trigger accidents and 
miscalculations that can result in a violent escalating conflict even against the political will of 
both sides. China has still to recognise those dangers of unilateral actions of a ‘creeping occu-
pation’, linked with armed displacement and armed enforcement that changes the status quo 
in the region. The 1996 unexplained clash between the Philippine navy and suspected Chinese 
gunboats 120 km northwest of Manila, for instance, is just one example of those inadvertent 
naval confrontations.62 Feeling betrayed by China as well as by the other ASEAN states63, the 
Philippines, meanwhile, has strengthened their defence cooperation with the U.S by signing 
and ratifying the VFA.  
In this context, it is important to note that the Chinese understanding of territorial sover-
eignty is not only antiquated in the era of globalisation in regard to official positions of the 
Chinese government. Even political reformers and dissidents have defended China’s “na-
tional interests” n the South China Sea and its territorial claims as a “sacred duty”.64 In their 
view, China’s territorial claims are ultimately “on-negotiable”and often even the use of force 
as an instrument of foreign policy and tool of coercion to achieve political objectives in the 
South China Sea cannot be excluded.65 At the same time, as the number of competing com-
mercial and military activities as well as hardware increases, the likelihood of unintended con-
frontations between claimants is rising too.  
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2.2 The Security Context in Perspective: Demands of Energy and Natural 
Resources66 
Despite the recent eruption of numerous territorial disputes in East Asia, it seems that those 
conflicts are not so dangerous that they destabilise the entire region, which would always re-
quire a strong and timely international intervention. Presently, all claimant states seem princi-
pally aware that they will only benefit from the putative oil and gas deposits and mineral re-
serves in the South China Sea – which are estimated to be similar to those in the Persian Gulf 
– or the rich fishing grounds of the Okhotsk Sea when they can be fully developed in an at-
mosphere of stability and peace in the region. But tense rivalries over those lucrative deposits 
are also the result of declining domestic stocks and the expansion of an economy that de-
mands more and more resources not to be found in their countries. Consequently, in the light 
of the region’s remarkable economic growth, Asian energy demand is not keeping pace with 
energy supply. In the next 15 years, East Asia’s energy demand might well double whilst 
Asia’s current 75 per cent dependence on that region for its oil supplies is believed to rise to 
95 per cent.67 The consequence might be an unsettling combination of more competitive 
Asian regional energy markets and rising dependence on the Middle East. Altough the current 
economic crisis has also dampened the overal energy demand in Asia, the decrease in the de-
mand for oil has often been highly exaggerated.68 
China is also in this regard a particular problem and challenge because it holds the key to 
regional energy security. China’s energy usage is one of the most important political and eco-
nomic issues facing Asia over the next 20 years. With 9.6 million square kilometers and a 
population of 1.17 billion, in 1993 it became an oil-importing nation for the first time in about 
30 years and is meanwhile already the second-largest energy consumer in the world behind the 
United States. China currently imports 600,000 barrels of oil per day, which might increase to 
3 million barrels by the year 2010. Analysis suggest that the gap between oil supply and con-
sumption will rise to 50m tons whilst indigenous supplies in China can satisfy only 70 per 
cent of its oil demands by the year 2000, as a consequence of the increasing imbalance be-
tween escalating economic growth and lower domestic oil production until the end of the cen-
tury and beyond. By tripling its energy demand by 2010-2015, China will become the world’s 
second largest oil consumer behind the USA.69 It seems to be only a question of time before 
China will finally surpass the United States as the leading consumer of energy. 
The country currently gets 80 per cent of its energy from coal. Any further increase in coal 
production will lead to further environment degradation and ultimately hamper economic 
growth. China is already second only to the United States in emissions of the greenhouse  
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gases that cause global warming. Together with the United States, both countries account for 
more than 36 per cent of such emissions worldwide.70 Increasing the use of natural gas would 
certainly ease the country’s dependence on coal and oil, but depends on considerable domestic 
and foreign investment. Over the next five years, China’s demand for liquified natural gas 
(LNG) – like in the rich Natuna fields – is expected to rise by 72 per cent to 18.13 million 
metric tons per year while the demand within Asia as a whole will simultaneously also grow 
further.71 Symptomatically for China’s looming energy problems, the Chinese National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has embarked on a number of overseas oil and gas 
explorations and production in Peru, Thailand, Venezuela and Canada. It has successfully 
competed recovery oil from a Sudanese oilfield and is now studying other options in Russia, 
Pakistan, Kazakstan, Indonesia, Egypt, Ecuador and Argentina. Other Chinese energy projects 
have been pursued in Malaysia, Turkmenistan, Thailand, Mongolia and Bangladesh.72 
As one way out of these energy dependencies and being confronted with increasing envi-
ronmental problems such as acid rain, air pollution and global warming effects, nuclear power 
might be the primary energy solution for East Asian states and an alternative or substitute for 
their coal-fired power with its massive emission of greenhouse gases. At the same time, how-
ever, the civilian use of nuclear power offers incentives and some important technology know-
how, which could speed up the development of nuclear weapons.73 
Similar demands arise for the Chinese leadership in regard to other natural resources such 
as water74 and food. Annually, China is losing 11 billion square metres of arable land whilst 
its huge population further continues to grow by almost 20 million per year despite China’s 
harsh “one-child” policy. Given the fact that the amount of arable land per person in China is 
already less than one-third of the worldwide average75, the search for Chinese lebensraum and 
the major policy goal of recovering lost Chinese territory no longer seem merely the result of 
historical ambitions. Hence the search for living space and ‘Lebensraum’ have culminated in a 
new nationalist ideology, demanding that “our area for survival is shrinking … Actually [we 
have to] reclaim sovereignty and sovereign interests in the oceans – territorial seas, continen-
tal shelf and exclusive economic zones – a total area of 3 million square kilometres.”76  
Hence China’s increasing assertive behaviour in the South China Sea since the end of the 
1980s must be seen in the wider context of its energy and other resource-related policies 
which are a basic pre-condition for its future economic growth.77 Confronted with declining 
oil reserves and rapidly growing domestic consumption due to the economic growth, China is        
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under increasing pressure to find new reserves. Though experts disagree about the size of po-
tential oil resources in the disputed territories within the South China Sea such as the Spratly 
archipelago, China seems confident of the existence of very large reserves as numerous Chi-
nese surveys have indicated. Thus already in 1989, a Chinese expert had argued: 
“International competition and struggle will focus increasingly on scientific and technological superiority. 
But such traditional strategic objectives as control of natural resources, markets, land and sea lanes will by 
no means become insignificant. In many areas, contention over these traditional objectives may lead to 
new acute conflicts.Because many will view each inch of land as precious as gold and every drop of water 
as valuable as oil, especially in areas with too many mouths to feed and too little to feed them with, new 
conflicts may be inevitable regardless of man’s will. New and old land and sea border disputes – such as 
the invasion China’s islands in the South China Sea – are intensifying with each passing day and may not 
necessarily wait until the next century. It seems particularly clear that the main direction of future conflicts 
is shifting towards the high seas.”78 
Ji Guoxing, a leading Chinese expert on Beijing’s South China Sea policy, confirmed in 1998: 
“Energy security is matter of life and death for China. China is well aware that energy is one of the most 
critical issues in the development of its economy, and that the realization of its modernization is insepara-
ble from the question of energy resources.” 79 
An U.S. expert, Michael Studeman, has recently cogently concluded in a detailed analysis the 
primary importance of China’s energy policies as a determinant for China’s policies in the 
South China Sea: 
“Economic imperatives have emerged as the crucial factor in the timing and rationale for China’s ex-
panded presence in the South China Sea. While the golden thread of sovereignty is interlaced with China’s 
every move in the Spratlys in particular, current trends indicate that China takes action when economic 
threats break a threshold of tolerance. As innocuous as they appear, offshore joint development schemes 
sponsored by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been consistently interpreted by Beijing as se-
rious threats to its prosperity. Indeed, the triggers that set PLAN warships into motion are resource-related 
encroachments by China’s neighbors. In an era of resource scarcity, these events more than any other 
heighten China’s sense of territorial and economic vulnerability. Viewed in this light, China’s occupation 
of reefs in 1988, the 1992 sea law, and the Mischief Reef takeover were driven less by opportunism than a 
belief that it was necessary to respond to imminent challenges to presumed Chinese domination over these 
maritime area.” 80 
Although the question of how much oil and gas is in the Spratly Islands region has yet to be 
determined, China’s policy follows its expectations as well as assumptions about potential oil 
and gas reserves.81 In addition, it is closely linked with territorial sovereignty issues and the 
power of Chinese nationalism filling the ideological vacuum left by the dismise of the maoist-
communist ideology. 
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However, energy resources are not the only factor, which might trigger resource-related 
conflicts in the region. Fishing conflicts, for instance, have a long history in Southeast Asia. 
Asia’s fish stocks are shrinking because of over-exploitation and pollution. Additionally, the 
increase in fishing fleets has contributed to deplete regional fishing stocks.82 The competition 
between increasing numbers of fishing boats might some day lead to a new era of fish wars. 
During the last decade, the competition for scarce resources has repeatedly led to clashes be-
tween neighbors in Southeast. Presently, six of the 10 leading fish countries are Asian: China 
takes the world’s biggest catch (at 12 million tonnes in 1990); Thailand is the world’s biggest 
fish seller, and Japan is the world’s biggest fish buyer, accounting for a third of world imports. 
The 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, by stretching national maritime boundaries to 
200 sea miles from shorelines, has brought more than three-quarters of the world’s waters and 
90 per cent of the world’s fish into national jurisdiction, which has resulted in overlapping 
territorial claims. An article in the “Far Eastern Economic Review” in March 1997 warned:  
“Fishing supports more livelihoods and fish sustains more diets in Asia than in any other region of the 
world. No surprise then that competition for scarce resources is leading to clashes between neighbors, par-
ticularly in Southeast Asia, as fishing fleets stray across maritime borders depleting stocks in their own 
waters.”83 
The South China Sea has so become a potential source of increasingly scarce resources. Ac-
cordingly, a modernisation of China’s armed forces with special focus on its air and naval 
forces started in the 1980s. At the same time, since the end of the 1980s, China’s naval forces 
had already abandoned its former “coastal defense strategy” and proclaimed the development 
until 2040 of a blue-water navy with aircraft carriers as its centrepiece.84 Since the second 
half of the 1980s, the traditional “offshore active defense strategy” has also been redefined 
with four new factors for modern naval warfare. As a Taiwanese expert analysed: “the defense 
concept of extended strategic depth; the emerging perception of local wars as the main form 
of armed conflict in the future; the justification of offensive operations under the rubric of 
active defense; and the emphasis of the ‘expertise’ and technology over the ‘red’ dimension 
and political indoctrination.”85 These doctrinal shifts were the major stimulus for China’s 
modernisation and procurement policies. Since the mid-1980s and even more since the begin-
nings of the 1990s, the PLA’s modernisation programs has pointedly focused on the nuclear 
armed forces, the navy and the air forces. They have fueled fears of a possible military clash 
over long-standing territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea (Spratlys, Tiaoyutai 
islets etc.). 
 
In this light, China’s changing offshore strategy in the second half of the 1980s, from a 
traditional “coastal defense” to “defense of the adjoining seas” to cover widespread sover-
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eignty and offshore interests, as well as the Chinese weaponry acquisitions by placing priority 
on air and naval modernisation and expanding programs, must be seen in the context of rap-
idly raising energy demands and import problems from abroad as well as demands on other 
natural resources. Taking into account that currently the Middle East has approximately 66 per 
cent of the world’s oil reserves while Asia has only 4 per cent, not only the sea lanes in the 
South China Sea are utmost important for China and the other new major consumers in Asia 
but also those of the Indian Ocean and of the
 Straits of Malacca. 
2.3 Implications for ASEAN’s Constructive Engagement Policy Towards China 
All East and Southeast Asian countries tend to reinforce their claims not only by diplomatic 
but also by military means. They might feel pressed to do so before any Chinese military 
buildup could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. With better equipped 
navies as the result of the region’s arms build-up and economic growth in the last years86, all 
competing South China rivals and South East Asian states will in the near future have the 
means to enforce their claims and protect their fishery interests towards the others. In the light 
of rapidly changing security challenges and the acquisition of long-range weapons systems, 
the geographical division in (North) East and South East Asia is no longer reassuring for 
ASEAN. Any conflict in one or the other subregion will have severe impact on the entire re-
gion.  
In the light of the shrinking of energy resources and  growing demand, these territorial dis-
putes might become even more dangerous in the near future by escalating other conflicts be-
tween Asian-Pacific states if they will not be addressed more efficiently and effectively in 
multilateral security forums as a way of finding a modus vivendi between all claimant states. 
Furthermore, China’s claims in particular complicates the issue of overseas Chinese on the 
region and might raise questions about their national identity and regional loyalty87 – albeit 
the     potential of using them as an instrument of Beijing is often exaggerated.88 Thus far, 
some ASEAN states such as Indonesia and Malaysia prefer to resolve their disputes over the 
Sipadan and Ligitan islands, for instance, rather through traditional bilateral negotiations (ref-
ered often to as the typical ‘Asian way’), or agree to refer the conflict to the UN International 
Court of Justice for adjudication. Others such as Thailand and Malaysia have agreed to re-
solve their dispute over a 7,250 square-kilometer area of overlapping claims in the South   
China Sea by establishing a joint development zone for natural oil and gas production.89 But 
not all of the overlapping claims are bilateral in nature and not all disputes can be resolved             
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bilaterally, particularly when China is involved and a single ASEAN state is too weak to with-
stand Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. 
Against this background and given China’s difficult domestic transformation process, any 
constructive engagement policies from outside might have only limited success if one consid-
ers the political priorities of China’s leadership (such as political and systemic stability) and 
the widening diverse interests of the elite. Parts of the Chinese military elite appear to be one 
of the main driving forces behind China’s assertiveness. They have played a central role in 
foreign policies as a result of the weakness of the current party leadership and the corrosion of 
the communist ideology recent years. Despite China’s preoccupation with economic moderni-
sation (by maintaining simultaneously a socialist political system) and by trying to emerge as 
one of the largest economies as the world which demands trust and confidence in its relations 
with its neighbors for future economic prosperity, these domestic circumstances make China’s 
foreign and security policies inevitably to some extent unpredictable for ASEAN. Further-
more, the South China Sea is vital for China’s survival. It has been the main corridor for 
China’s trade and the principal gateway to the outside world. It provides access to the eco-
nomic heartlands of southern China. Though China published Defence White Papers in 
199590 and July 199891 and has made some progress towards more openess, the lack of trans-
parency in China’s security and defence policies still raises suspicion, distrust and concern 
within the region. In this light, the main uncertainty for the future stability and prosperity of 
the region remains China in the foreseeable future. Against this background, the main diffi-
culty and task how to engage China in order to solve the traditional security dilemmas in the 
region will remain at the top of the future regional security agenda as Jose T. Almonte, the 
Philippine adviser for the president and the General Director of the
 National Security Council, 
has confirmed: 
“East Asia’s greatest single problem is how to incorporate China into its regional arrangements – how to 
‘socialise’ the country by reducing the element of threat while accentuating the positive elements in 
China’s regional relationships.” 92 
On the other hand, the potential energy and mineral reources in the South China Sea might 
only be commercially expoitable with foreign investment and technologies. Thus, China’s 
economic dependence on Japan, the U.S. and the EU might increase rather than decline in the 
age of globalisation – a fact which might constrain China’s foreign and security policies in the 
21st century. 
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3. Playing a Regional-Wide Security Role in Asia-Pacific? – ASEAN’s 
Ambivalent Relationship to Japan 
3.1 Redefining Japan’s Foreign and Security Agenda in the Post-Cold War Era 
Japan, too, is in the midst of adjusting its foreign and security agenda to the newly emerging 
regional and global framework, as well as the general security environment.93 But the Japa-
nese search for an internationally acceptable regional and global role is greatly complicated by 
a continuing economic recession, deep-seated pacifist roots in the political culture and exter-
nal developments as well as expectations of its Asian neighbors and Western partners. 
During the 1980s and the first half of 1990s as a “civilian power” (Hanns W. Maull94) it 
concentrated its economic and investment policies in the Asia-Pacific region and, in doing so 
it also expanded its cultural and political networks.95 During the same period, intra-regional 
trade has grown faster than extra-regional trade. Thus Japan has become the largest source of 
aid to ASEAN countries. Trade with the five ASEAN countries amounted to $74 billion in 
1995 (some 16 per cent of its total trade), and the cumulative investment in the area was $33 
billion. Furthermore, with the exception of Singapore, Malaysia and China, Japan has also 
become the largest foreign investor in all of the region’s major countries.96 Against the back-
ground of increasing welfare and prosperity in Japan and the entire Asia-Pacific region, the 
Japanese hesitation and reluctance in unilaterally pursuing an explicit independent role for 
itself in the maintenance of Asia’s regional security has proven to be quite comfortable for 
Japan and its Asian neighbors.  
With the end of the Cold War regional security has changed with new arising security 
challenges and uncertainties. Coping with new potential security threats, Japan needs to ex-
pand its security ties in the region. Japan, for instance, has the largest volume of inter-regional 
trade and shipping through South-East Asia’s SLOCs and is thus mostly vulnerable to any       
interruption, particularly oil supplies. Thus, a close political cooperation with the ASEAN 
countries will be a crucial prerequisite for Japan’s political and economic stability in the fu-
ture. Furthermore, after the Gulf War 1990-91, a “chequebook-diplomacy” and “sending 
money” to increase steadily its sphere of influence and to fulfil the international obligations in 
the region while others have to pay with the death of their soldiers is for Japan (as it is for 
Germany) no longer acceptable in the view of other global and regional powers. That has 
complicated Japan’s intention to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.97 
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Against this background, Japan’s often caricatured “trader’s diplomacy” in the traditional 
sense has now to cope with new internal and external circumstances that will shape new direc-
tions and goals of Japan’s foreign policies on the regional and global level. It demands, as 
Reinhard Drifte has concluded for Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security 
Council, that “the whole policy culture (including domestic politics) has to change.”98 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japan has, indeed, tried to widen and to deepen relations 
with ASEAN. In January 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa announced the so-called “Miya-
zawa-doctrine”’, proclaiming the need for a close Japan-ASEAN dialogue to promote re-
gional stability. It followed former Japanese initiatives to strengthen ties with Southeast 
Asia.99 His “two-track approach”, announced in July 1992 in Washington, envisioned the 
strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship whilst simultaneously the traditional 
bilateralism has been complemented by new efforts towards
 
“the promotion  of subregional 
cooperation to settle disputes and conflicts” and “region-wide political dialogue to enhance 
the sense of mutual reassurance.”100 Japan has also created new subregional security ties and 
important defence linkages with the ASEAN countries, South Korea and China.101 In the last 
four years, Tokyo also extended its defence relations to Vietnam102 and particularly to Austra-
lia. Canberra has often taken over the role of the United States when it was impossible for 
Washington to strengthen its military ties. In this respect, the Indonesia-Australian security 
agreement of December 1995 is a perfect example of Australia’s growing security and defence 
role in the region.103 
At the same time, Japan has played a pivotal role as one of the “drafters” in establishing a 
multilateral security dialogue, cumulating in the creation of ASEAN’s Regional Forum (ARF) 
and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as a “track two”-process 
of the ARF.104 For Japan’s Foreign Ministry, this multilateralism was a vehicle to enhance 
trust and confidence in the region without undermining the existing bilateral security relation-
ship with the U.S. Furthermore, it was seen as another instrument to deepen and consolidate 
its relations with ASEAN and other maritime states such as Australia in order to solidify its 
strategic security position vis-à-vis China.105 
These discussions and new directions of Japan’s foreign policies are clear indications that 
Japan is increasingly devising a security policy of its own which is no longer just a reflection 
                                                 
98  See ibid. (105). 
99  See Pohl (1993) and Sudo (1988). To the background of Japan’s changing foreign policies see Wanner 
(1997), Drifte (1996), Hunsberger (1996) and Maull (1994). 
100  Quoted following Soeya (1994: 87). 
101  See Hughes (1996). 
102  See ADJ (3/1997: 56). 
103  See also Ball/Kerr (1996). The bilateral security agreement between Australia and Indonesia see in: ibid. 
(143f.). 
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of U.S. policy, as has been the case for the last 50 years.106 In this regard, Japan’s relations 
with China promise to be the key uncertainty in the new evolving regional security order of 
the 21st century although the bilateral relationship between China and the United States has 
generated the most attention and discussion in recent years. 
In the view of many other East Asian states, too, Japan is expected to play a greater role in 
regional security than in the past when Japan’s regional role was limited to provide Asian 
countries only Official Development Aid (ODA) and technical cooperation. Although Japan’s 
public assistance and private investment still plays an important role in the ASEAN-states 
(such as in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia)107, Japan has also sought a more active political 
role in the Asian region. This goal might not only be the result of a growing political self-
confidence and a foreign encouragement, but also of a declining ODA budget which was al-
ways seen as an economic and political tool to promote Japan’s sphere of interests in the re-
gion. Compared to 1995, it dropped 35 per cent in 1996 to 9.57 billion Yen108 and in 1998, it 
has been predicted to decline further 30-40 percent compared to 1997109. 
The Taiwan crisis and the Chinese missile tests as well as the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands dis-
pute in 1996 have all heightened fears of a Chinese hegemony in Japan’s political elite and 
public opinion. In doing so ASEAN’s and Japan’s interests in the South China dispute appear 
to converge because both have been alarmed by China’s destablising activities in the area. 
Tokyo also agrees with the ASEAN states and the United States that China has to be engaged 
as an equal partner rather than to be contained. This conclusion is also based on the fact that 
China is Japan’s second-largest trading partner (after the United States), while it ranks first in 
China’s foreign trade. By further widening the bilateral trade and by an increasing flow of 
Japanese and Chinese visitors into their countries110, the political and economic interdepend-
ence might increase in the long-run to an extent that will hopefully downplay any potential 
conflicts between both major powers in East Asia – albeit strategic trends in the domestic as 
well as foreign and security policies of both major Asian powers often seem to indicate the 
opposite trend towards a political and military rivalry.  
With encouragement of the United States and other Western powers, Japan has also wid-
ened the tasks and missions of its Self Defence Forces when it had contributed troops to 
peacekeeping operations of the UN in limited roles (especially in Cambodia in 1991). The 
renewed security treaty with the United States in April 1996 and the negotiations to review the 
1978 “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation” which have been finalized in September 1997 are 
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108  See Tsutomu Wada. Nikkei Weekly (14 April 1997). 
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– despite all inherent problems and unresolved issues – another indicator for Japan’s growing 
political role in East Asia.111  
However, Japan is facing many obstacles – domestically as well as externally – on the way 
to assume a greater security role in Asia. The domestic and foreign criticism of the so-called 
“Hashimoto-Doctrine” (in continuity of the “Miyazawa-doctrine”) which has called for regu-
lar summits with ASEAN in order to discuss security, trade, investment and official aid for 
other countries, in January 1997 have indicated that both Japan and the ASEAN countries 
seem currently not fully prepared to accept new regional obligations and responsibilities taken 
over by Japan in the name of regional security.112 It also revealed the ambivalent attitude of 
ASEAN towards Japan because – by holding those regular annual meetings – it would give 
Tokyo an exclusive and preeminent relationship with ASEAN becoming one of the world’s 
leading trading and investment bloc. ASEAN states feared it could offend China unless Bei-
jing is offered similar treatment. Moreover, China could perceive such an alliance as another 
proof of a regional containment strategy directed by the United States and Japan.  
At the same time, ASEAN member states are still concerned that a more assertive Japan 
could weaken the longstanding alliance with the United States and finally lead to a Japanese 
rearmament that might provoke similar responses from China. Moreover, Japan’s former 
strong man and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, for instance, was the former president of 
the perceived nationalistic “War Bereaved Families Association” in Japan and has long sym-
pathised with those who considered Japan as a victim rather than as an aggressor in World 
War II. Nonetheless, finally, the ASEAN states have modified the original Hashimoto-
Doctrine and invited Japan, South Korea and China together to their 30th anniversary in 
Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 that has opened the perspective of regular discussions be-
tween ASEAN and these three Northeast Asian countries.113 These annual East Asian sum-
mits can also contribute to a more visible role of Japan in the wider Asia-Pacific region. 
The current financial and economic crises in East Asia and Japan, however, have posed 
further constraints to Japan’s economic and foreign policies in the region. Facing its own de-
flationary recession, Japan seemed initially unable to strengthen its economic ties to the 
ASEAN states in crisis and its new members Laos and Burma which would facilitate Hashi-
moto’s previously proposed “broader and deeper” ties beyond trade and investment as well as 
“frank” bilateral dialogues on regional security with each member of ASEAN. While ASEAN 
states sought also initially the help and support of Japan after the breakout of the financial and 
economic crisis in the summer of 1997, Japan was not the solution but rather one of the main 
                                                 
111  See also Umbach (2000b: my chapter ‘The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance’ in this book). 
112  See, for instance, the Editorials of Asahi Evening News (25 January 1997) and Mainichi Daily News (8 
January 1997). 
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problems in the region  – a fact which has, meanwhile, also been recognised in other Asian 
countries (Taiwan).114 In the summer of 1998 Kenneth S. Curtis warned: 
“The stakes are very high. If Japan does not quickly chart a bold course, it is very unlikely that the yen, 
and thus the other economies of East Asia, can be stabilized. That would leave China with little option but 
to devalue in a desperate, if futile, move of self-protection. A competitive downspiral in East Asian cur-
rencies could drag down financial markets around the world. Japan has a choice. It can either be the No.1 
problem or the solution.”115  
Concerns over closer U.S.-Chinese relations and seeing China as the main rival to Japan’s role 
in Asia as well as U.S. criticism of a lack of Japanese leadership in trade talks before the 
APEC summit in November 1998116 as part of a silent crisis of confidence between both 
sides117, have prompted Tokyo finally to come up by launching a joint finance and debt re-
structuring initiative with Washington. It included a $10 billion Asia crisis fund as part of a 
$30 billion initiative, so-called the “New Miyazawa Initiative”, to support Asia’s struggling 
private sector and lead the way out of the economic crisis.118 In doing so Japan has strength-
ened its voice in the region but in general, it has in the view of the ASEAN member states 
played a rather disappointing role during the economic crisis. Furthermore, the changes in its 
political system – as a major prerequisite for a more efficient role of Japan in the region and 
world affairs – are still insufficient, particularly with regard to a critical reassessment of Ja-
pan’s past militaristic policies. 
3.2 The Burden of History – The “Ambiguous Japan” as a “Constraint Power” 
“According to the peace myth, the Japanese people are naturally peaceful, but were led awry by power-
hunger militarists and monopolistic capitalists during World War II. Because the Japanese people are 
pacifistic, the peace myth argues that the atomic bombings were racially-motivated violence against inno-
cent people rather than an effective way to end the war as many Americans believe. As the only major na-
tion with a peace constitution, Japan has a responsibility, the myth asserts, to promote peace around the 
world. The peace myth, thus, combines, ideas of a universal world peace with Japanese uniqueness and 
tinges of anti-American nationalism. ...The peace myth does more to prevent Japanese reconciliation with 
Asia than any other myth because its casts Japan as a victim of war, not the aggressor, even as Japan tries 
to promote universal ‘world peace’.” 
(So the Northeast Asian specialist Robert J. Fouser in a Korean newspaper in January 1997119) 
                                                 
114  See also Thomas Crampton, IHT (1998: 14). 
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Most Japanese believe that their country has such a strong pacifist tradition that it will never 
start another aggressive policy or war. But the self-image of Japan provides a striking contrast 
to the perception of Japan in other East Asian countries. Any increased Japanese leadership, 
assertion of power or security role will almost automatically resemble Japan’s aggressive and 
militaristic role in the first half of this century.120 In the view of other Asian nations that suf-
fered under the Japanese imperial policies before and during World War II, the official Japa-
nese history (particularly in schoolbooks) of the first half of this century continues to create 
mistrust in the present foreign policy of Japan.121 By opening new U.S. archives and studying 
archive material of the 1940s and 1950s, Japan is now confronted with additional historical 
facts and figures and thus with new burdens of the past. These historical burdens inevitably 
complicate Japan’s foreign policies and non-proliferation efforts, particularly raising suspi-
cions of its neighbors. Hence Japan’s disputed historical interpretations have important impli-
cations on its present foreign policies. The creation of joint study groups for reviewing the 
history of the first half of the 20th century of Japanese and other Asian historians might help 
to bridge these gaps in the future. But it will take time and not help Japan on the way to as-
sume a greater political role in the short- and mid-term. 
Although most of the ASEAN states are often downright conciliatory and mostly do not 
expect Japan to adopt similar policies to those of the past – in contrast to China and South 
Korea which use these historical reminiscences as an argument against a stronger Japanese 
role in Asia -, they remain uncertain and fear, nevertheless, the impact it may have on China 
by strengthening its nationalism. Furthermore, as long as the Japanese political class does not 
really recognise its historical guilt and moral responsibility for its militaristic and aggressive 
policies, the foreign policy agenda will automatically lack a certain amount of trust and confi-
dence. As Kosaka Masataka, a respected Japanese expert, stated in 1996: “To face the issue of 
war responsibility firmly rather than finesse it may be the key task of Japan’s security policy. 
If the Japanese spirit is corroded by continued evasion and equivocation, no amount of 
power, wisdom, or money will help.”122 
As long as the political elite of Japan is leaning towards a “Japan-as-victim” school of 
thought and as long as 150 lawmakers, including Prime Minister Hashimoto and two cabinet 
ministers, visit the Yasukuni shrine (dedicated to the spirits of deceased military personell 
including those executed as World War II war criminals) as in 1996 and 1997, the problem is, 
indeed, not Japan’s past but present. Trust and confidence can only be granted and earned but 
not bought. As the Editorial of the Far Eastern Economic Review pointed out in May 1997: 
“For the irony of Japan's revisionism is that at a time when the region is ripe for Japanese 
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leadership, it sows suspicion among neighbors about Japanese motives and thus renders itself 
an ineffectual player on the world field.”123 
Japan has meanwhile admitted to the historical guilt of its former colonisation of Korea 
prior to the end of World War II , during Kim Dae Jung’s visit in October 1998. However and 
in contrast to the unqualified “apology” for Japan’s aggression on the Korean peninsula dur-
ing 35 years at that visit124, the last summit talks with China during Jiang Zemin’s visit in 
Tokyo in November 1998 highlighted Japan’s inability to make peace with itself and its 
neighbors over its role in World War II and China’s unwillingness to look forward to a con-
structive future.125 As a German newspaper headline commented: “The more Japan presses 
ahead, the more China looks back.”126 Although the communique worked out for the summit 
for the first time included the word of “aggression” specifically against China and expressed 
the “deep remorse” for the war, the Japanese government with the new Prime Minister Keizo 
Obuchi (since July 1998), under pressure from right-wing LDP legislators, refused to use the 
word “apology” (which many Japanese feel is more serious than the word ‘remorse’) China 
insisted on in the joint declaration of
 
“a friendly partnership to advance peace and develop-
ment”. Hence, the two leaders did not formally sign the document.127 At the end, it reflected 
the rather disappointing summit, as well as the growing frictions, divisions and mounting mu-
tual mistrust on a number of other controversial issues (Taiwan, theater missile defense, the 
U.S.-Japanese security alliance128) between Japan and China. As an editorial of a Korean 
newspaper concluded: “Unfortunately, it is too often the case that we learn from history is 
that we do not learn from history.”129 Furthermore, the diplomatic humiliation of China’s 
President Jiang Zemin when he failed to obtain an officially written apology about Japan’s 
atrocities in China might have him made more vulnerable to conservative hardliners at home.  
Like Germany in Europe, Japan’s foreign and security policies can only be successful if 
Tokyo is able to build up trust and confidence and if its policies are pursued in the framework 
of multilateral economic and security associations and organizations. Any unilateral Japanese 
approach to strengthen its security role in Asia-Pacific, by contrary, would immediately raise    
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distrust and concern among the Asian neighbors. But given the predominantly pacifist senti-
ments in public, the current interpretation of collective security in Japan’s “Peace Constitu-
tion” that prohibits the country from deploying troops to settle international disputes (with the 
exception of traditional peacekeeping efforts but even these with a number of restrictions) and 
Asia’s memories of Japanese aggression during the colonial rule and World War II, Japan’s 
willingness and ability to assume a greater political and security role for regional stability will 
also in the future be limited for some time. “Political leadership” for Japan therefore can only 
translate into a rather “silent diplomacy” of Japan for the time being. To this extent, Tokyo’s 
political ability of response to conflicts and disputes such as in the South China Sea will also 
be constrained. Against this background, Yoshihide Soeya concluded in 1996: 
“Lacking a military option in its diplomacy, Japan can help to balance the scales of power in the region 
only by means of the US-Japan security alliance. However, Japan’s dependence in the security realm 
makes ASEAN its natural partner in its pursuit of regional security cooperation in general and the South 
China Sea in particular.”130 
4. The Impact of Great Powers on ASEAN-10: Implications for the Future 
of the Multilateralisation and Institutionalisation of ASEAN’s Se-          
curity 
Despite ASEAN’s historical, political, economic, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, the 
multilateralisation and institutionalisation of ASEAN’s security have made significant pro-
gress since the creation of ASEAN’s Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and of the Council of 
Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) in 1993/94.131 These processes have helped 
ASEAN to assume the leading role in defining its goals, scope, and processes132, but they 
remain dependent on the political cohesion and unity of ASEAN as well as on the stability of 
the strategic triangle (China, Japan, and USA) in the Asia-Pacific region. Given ASEAN’s 
ambivalent relations with China and Japan and the unclear triangular relationship among these 
major three powers in Asia-Pacific, the future process of multilateralisation and institutionali-
sation in Asia-Pacific remains uncertain, particularly in regard to the efficiency and effectivity 
of preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and management.  
Despite ASEAN’s economically dynamic and successful regional economic cooperation 
and integration, the most important purpose and foremost raison d’etre of the association will 
also in the future be political and strategic. Asia cannot prosper indefinitely without the confi-
dence that comes from satisfactory security arrangements to cope with unpredictable events 
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and worst case-scenarios, which are underpinning all defence planning. But the new security 
arrangements within ongoing multilateralisation and institutionalisation processes are rather 
slowly emerging in the region. Although these processes will move forward and become even 
more important, the ARF’s and CSCAP’s main purpose for the time being seems to lie still in 
the field of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs as the OSCE/CSCE is doing 
it in Europe) and broader security discussions rather than becoming a multilateral or even a 
supranational institution for conflict resolution and management that is rather a long-term 
task.133 Hence, realistically speaking, the ARF cannot replace firm security arrangements in-
volving specific bi- or multi-lateral defence commitments (such as NATO’s in Europe) in the 
foreseeable future. Those specific defence arrangements in Asia-Pacific are tailored in tradi-
tional bilateral defence and security treaties particularly with the United States.134 An analysis 
of “The Limits of the ASEAN Way” already concluded in October 1997 that ASEAN “must be 
careful not to exaggerate either its own influence or the accplicability of its experience to the 
much more diverse membership and different circumstances of ARF.”135 
In the mid-term, the security architecture of the Asian-Pacific region will comprise tradi-
tional and new bilateral relationships with new intervowen multilateral security arrangements 
such as the ARF and CSCAP rather than replace the bilateral security ties with the United 
States. Characteristically, the spectacular bilateral security treaty between Australia and Indo-
nesia in December 1995, an enhanced forthcoming security accord between Australia and 
Singapore, the recent strengthening of the Five Power Defence Arrangement between Singa-
pore-Malaysia-Australia-New Zealand and Great Britain136, and as well as rumours of a re-
vival of a Philippine-U.S. security alliance137 are indicators for the future importance of the 
bilateral security and defence ties between ASEAN and external powers. In that context, Aus-
tralia plays an increasing role for ASEAN states as Leonard C. Sebastian has stated: 
“These security arrangements can be viewed as an early indication of how the Asia-Pacific power balance 
will evolve over the next few decades. States in the region may opt for the Australian approach – a web of 
bilateral treaties with Australia at the centre – to give greater strategic depth rather than overdependence 
on the multilateral option which is cumbersome and prone to manipulation by self-interested powers. The 
hope is that in the time, the multilateral security approaches will be taken seriously enough – a number of 
non security concerns can only be dealt with through this medium.”138 
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At the same time, however, ASEAN has for the first time invited China, Japan and South Ko-
rea to an informal summit meeting (the “Commemorative Summit” to celebrate ASEAN’s 
30th anniversary) at the end of 1997 in Malaysia. It marked a clear shift by ASEAN to engage 
the most influential dialogue partners of the ARF more closely than the other dialogue part-
ners (the U.S. and Europe).139 By admitting Laos, Cambodia (although this step has been 
postponed due to the current domestic crisis), ASEAN has taken another step of its strategy to 
shape a balance of power in a region that aims to become more independent of all major ex-
ternal powers – whether it be the United States, China or Japan. In this context, ASEAN’s 
moving to engage the rising power of China also helps to counterbalance the weight of the 
United States and Japan in order to shape an ASEAN defined new strategic order in East Asia.  
But this kind of sensitive balancing of ASEAN’s weight vis-à-vis the three great powers in 
East Asia, is a very difficult one and needs a prudent strategy based on internal political co-
herence. An attempt to engage China at the expense of the United States, however, would 
automatically play into the hands of China and at the same time risk creating divisions in 
ASEAN. China is already promoting trade links with countries around the Bay of Bengal 
(Myanmar, Bangladesh and Thailand). By trading cheap arms in exchange for political sup-
port within the ARF on sensitive issues such as territorial conflicts, the U.S. military presence 
and the Taiwan question, Beijing is driving wedges into the political cohesiveness of ASEAN. 
Simultaneously, China’s strategic policies serve the expansion of its political influence in 
South- and Southeast Asia.140 
The process of creating a regional common sense on crucial security questions and to in-
crease the political leverage is thus also dependent on the future internal political cohesion of 
ASEAN. On ASEAN’s 30th anniversary, and with the admission of Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar to ASEAN, the future political perspectives of ASEAN seemed on the surface po-
litically and economically very bright. But its future was also uncertain due to the still existing 
diversity of and perceptions within the association.141 Myanmar’s admission was not only a 
contested debate within ASEAN itself but also between ASEAN and (its ARF dialogue part-
ners) the U.S. and Europe. While ten members would theoretically have raised ASEAN’s po-
litical and economic voice on the world stage, its rather enhanced diversity through admitting 
these three new controversial members (particularly Myanmar) has also undermined the inter-
nal political cohesion (which has been strengthened over the last decade) as it was assumed 
previously because it decides and works on the basis of consensus.142 Furthermore, almost all 
new members have little experience in the ASEAN tradition of “agreeing to disagree without 
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being disagreeable” (as Noordin Sopiee has admitted)143. As a result, ASEAN’s ability to act 
as a stabilising force has been diminished.  
These problems have become even more complicated when one considers the current in-
tra-ASEAN military cooperation. Despite ASEAN’s successful creation of a regional common 
sense on security in recent years, those tendencies have not been automatically transferred to a 
significant greater intra-ASEAN defence cooperation. Bi- and multilateral defence ties be-
tween the member states have certainly been increased, cumulating in numerous bi- and multi-
lateral military excercises to a mutual benefit.144 However, ASEAN’s defence cooperation 
has remained limited to the level of coping with low intensity threats such as piracy and 
smuggling. Exchanges of military intelligence, for instance, function only at the level of 
counter-insurgency operations. Defence links in ASEAN still lie more in the realms of confi-
dence-building than in functional cooperation towards practical objectives such as joint de-
fence planning, joint initiatives in arms purchasing and production, developing compatibility 
between different military doctrines and orders of battle and improving the interoperability 
between ASEAN’s armed forces.145 An important exeption is the cooperation regarding joint 
peacekeeping efforts, initiated in 1997. But these efforts are at the very beginning and reveal 
once again how difficult it still is to deepen the military dimension of intra-ASEAN coopera-
tion. Characteristically, it is less ASEAN itself than the FPDA which opens channels for 
communication regarding defence issues. The Intra-ASEAN defence relationships are there-
fore still characterised by a strange mixture of cooperation, competion and latent conflict that 
provides a striking picture of ASEAN’s self-declared image of an established and successful 
regional security order. Thus in particular, the defence planning of both Singapore and Malay-
sia is still based on the mistrust between each other, stimulating their arms acquisition policies 
and new threat perceptions toward each other.146 Depending on the definition, some experts 
called the nature of their arms acquisition process an “arms race”, others an “arms dynamic”, 
“involving a fairly intense process of competitive military procurement, infrastructural devel-
opment and operational planning, aimed at maintaining the military status quo between the 
two states”147 and “non-cooperative in nature”.148 Two analyses have concluded: 
“The absence of multilateral defence co-operation between ASEAN’s members, and the widespread lack 
of substance (other than in the sense of confidence-building) in bilateral defence co-operation indicate the 
most widely underestimated influence on defence policies in the region.”149 
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“ASEAN might never be a NATO but there is no reason why it should not present a more robust and 
united front to those who tend to ignore the association or take advantage of the ASEAN way. The com-
bined forces of ASEAN are in total impressive in quantity and quality. But they are, it must be admitted, 
lacking in cohesion, definition of objectives, and even general cooperation. Major benefits would accrue if 
these limitations were to be addressed.” 150 
The deepening of intra-ASEAN defence cooperation is also important because ASEAN’s de-
fence postures have begun to shift from an emphasis on counter-insurgency to conventional 
defence against external attacks. By combining their defence efforts, ASEAN would be able 
militarily to deter potential aggressors. As the Australian defence expert Brian Cloughley 
noted at the end of 1997: 
“If there is not a vigorous response by the ASEAN members as a defence grouping they could find them-
selves not only isolated, militarily, concerning the Spratlys (as they appear to be at the moment, diplo-
matically witness the ARF meeting) but bereft of significant economic resources to which they otherwise 
might have been able to lay claim. The ASEAN way works well when gentlemen are involved, as they 
have been for so long. It might not be a solution when the seas are full of sharks.” 151 
Moreover, without raising transparency, intensifying Confidence and Security Building Meas-
ures (CSBMs) and deepening defence cooperation within ASEAN, misperceptions in crisis 
will potentially increase and might lead to preemptive or preventive military actions during 
crisis and conflicts. The current financial and economic crisis might have reduced or post-
poned concerns about those acquisition trends and their security implications. But unfortu-
nately, the decline of regional defence expenditure has not only affected future procurement 
programmes, operations, and training but also defence cooperation between ASEAN member 
states, although the cuts are, in financial terms, rather insignificant. Normally, one could argue 
that defence cuts would result in enhanced rather than decreased defence cooperation by shar-
ing the common costs of training and education.152 Furthermore, as a result of cancelling joint 
training and exercise activities as well as decreasing the attendance of military officers at Staff 
Colleges in other countries disproportionally from the cuts in defence expenditures, the proc-
ess of enhancing CSBM and raising military transparancy in the region has been severely 
damaged.153 In this field, too, multilateralims had lost momentum by 1997. If ASEAN wishes 
to avoid future intra-ASEAN security dilemmas and at the same time to increase its efficiency 
in defending its national and regional security interests, ASEAN member states must not only 
be willing to seriously discuss greater ASEAN security co-ordination, but also greater defence 
cooperation. 
In the light of ASEAN-9 and the existing mistrust that stimulates competitive military doc-
trines and arms acquisition in ASEAN’s intra-defence relationships, ASEAN’s priority of 
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widening instead of (a simultaneous) deepening of the multilateralisation and institutionalisa-
tion of ASEAN has also backfired – as previously assumed – in its security institutions (ARF 
and CSCAP) if one considers the specific case of Myanmar and its close political, economic 
and military ties to China. Given the need to forge a unified stand by consensus, it was already 
prior to the admission difficult to imagine, for instance, that ASEAN-9 (including Myan-
mar154) would ever back one of its members in a conflict with China, as it has done recently 
by throwing official support behind Vietnam in maritime disputes with Beijing in 1995 and 
1997. By admitting Myanmar to ASEAN, the influence of China within ASEAN seems to 
have increased rather than reduced.155 Hence, the widening process of ASEAN had so far 
rather limited ASEAN’s capacity to act independently and critically towards great powers – 
particularly vis-à-vis Beijing. In this light, Myanmar might be even more challenging in the 
mid-term perspective for ASEAN than the current Cambodian crisis. Whether ASEAN is 
really able to deal with Myanmar “more effectively” in the long-term remains to be seen. By 
integrating these three countries, ASEAN is facing without doubtlessly for the mid-term per-
spective the greatest challenge for the grouping itself as well as for its external relations to the 
United States and Europe.  
5. Impacts of the Financial and Economic Crisis in East Asia on the Fu-
ture Balance of Forces – A Change in Leadership: The Decline of Japan 
and the Ascendancy of China? 
Despite the fact that the U.S. has retained the strategic balance of military power by declaring 
ist intention to maintain 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region as evidence of its commit-
ment, human right concerns, a new “donorgate” scandal and other domestic issues in the U.S. 
Congress as well as the Western policies to punish Burma seemed to have driven the South-
east Asian states at the end of 1997 closer to China and Japan.156 Washington’s rather muted 
response to the currency and financial crisis in Southeast Asia has sowed new suspicions and 
fuelled conspiracy theories and renewed anti-American sentiment in the region. The slow re-
sponse of the U.S. after the outbreak of the economic crisis with far-reaching impacts on 
Southeast Asian domestic and foreign policies, and the political instability in Indonesia with 
dangers of a “Balkanisation” as well as the re-emergence of traditional conflicts between 
ASEAN member states (such as between Malaysia and Singapore) have allowed particularly 
China to raise its influence at the expense of the U.S and as a counterweight to the U.S.-
Japanese security alliance. China, by constrast, has so far looked relatively stable both politi-
cally and economically. Moreover, Beijing initiated a diplomatic campaign to fashion a mod-
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ern version of the Middle Kingdom in the region. It included a $1 billion aid-programme to 
the IMF-led rescue plan for Thailand and Indonesia.157 In sum, it seemed that strategic bal-
ance of political influence tipped increasingly in favour of China, which has tried to capitalise 
on ASEAN’s weakness and Japan’s lack of leadership and its inability to scrap its “virtual 
policy” amidst the crisis in Southeast Asia.158 
At the beginning of the crisis, Japan seemed to be a more accomodating economic ally. 
Despite the fact of increased Japanese foreign-aid programmes, including a $30 billion rescue 
plan for the regional crisis in Southeast Asia, Tokyo, however, has been confronted with its 
own economic crisis159, affecting the political system and the bureaucracy to deal with it. 
Given the lack of leadership of Japan and America’s initial slow response to the financial and 
economic crisis as well as its inability to communicate in Southeast Asia without raising sus-
picions, it seems at first glance that the economic woes have forced the Asia-Pacific region to 
forge closer relations with China. The so-called “imperial intrigue” between the Malaysian 
prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and China’s Premier Li Peng seemed to indicate in Au-
gust and December 1997 during the first annual East Asian (ASEAN-plus-three) summit 
meeting those strategic trends. Furthermore, in the U.S. perception, China and ASEAN tried 
to foster a sense of unity by excluding the U.S.160  
A closer look at the emergence of the new Middle Kingdom in China reveals, however, 
that in reality, neither Japan nor China can replace the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region in its 
role as a stabilising force and the main balancer as well as the “benign hegemon” in the fore-
seeable future. Furthermore, though China has the political will, it is still lacking the eco-
nomic power to assume Japan’s role of any leadership. Its economy is six times that of China 
and accounts for more than 70 per cent of total East Asian economic output and purchasing 
power. Moreover, Tokyo has contributed $19 billion towards coping with the Asian financial 
crisis whilst China has provided only 10-15 per cent of that amount.161 Meanwhile, China 
itself has become infected by the Asian financial and currency crisis albeit mostly in different 
ways. It is confronted with a looming financial and banking crisis in the short-term and a more 
potential severe socio-economic destabilisation as well as a domestic political crisis in the 
mid-term perspective due to the current transformation and reform policies of its economic 
and political system undermining the communist ideology and the legitimisation of the politi-
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cal regime. In the next few years, it well face unprecedented socio-economic challenges that 
might well therefore have impacts on the stability of the political system. It is also suffering 
from widespread unemployment with 100-130 million people (about the population of Japan), 
which will further increase in the next years. Corruption has become endemic whilst the eco-
nomic progress is increasingly uneven between the coast and in the south on one side and the 
rural areas interior on the other side. Moreover, the export growth has declined since the end 
of 1998. Together with new trends of protectionism, slower growth in export markets, lower 
product prices and increasing competition from Latin America, the pressure to devaluate the 
renminbi and to subsidise its exporters will increase an such a develpment can only threaten 
its WTO entry.162 It might also result in Chinese efforts to take market share away from its 
Southeast Asian neighbors, which can lead to new economic and political conflicts between 
China and the ASEAN states. Against this background, China’s self-image as a new Middle 
Kingdom, as an “unsatisfied power”, provides still a striking picture with the economic and 
military realities as an “incomplete great power”. Some Chinese economist experts have al-
ready concluded that “China has turned from a regional stabilizer to a regional risk fac-
tor”.163 
Moreover, the criticism of the U.S. and the West in general by some ASEAN states after 
the outbreak the currency and financial crisis in the summer of 1997 was often very ambiva-
lent and largely unconvincing. When outside help was offered, it was initially denied because 
it is not an “Asian solution to Asian problems”. As Gerald Segal has concluded: “Many of the 
Southeast Asians who used to deride the Americans and Europeans as powers in decline now 
complain that Westerners are not doing enough to assist them. ... The moaners in Southeast 
Asia are the most infuriating – the biggest free-riders on American deterrence of China and 
defense of the global economy, and yet the quickest to carp.”164  
Furthermore, the Malasian security expert Joon Num Mak has reminded the ASEAN states 
that “the ‘ASEAN way’ was effective in managing sub-regional tensions only because there 
was a security umbrella provided by the USA which look after the main external threats to the 
region.”165 Thus the criticism by some of the ASEAN states provided a striking contrast to 
the central economic and political role the U.S. played in the international organisations for 
working out specific rescue plans for the ASEAN states. Furthermore, in the security field, the 
U.S. – as a “status quo power” – has expanded its military-to-military cooperation not only 
with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan but and also with some ASEAN states such as Singa-
pore, Thailand and the Philippines in recent years. It has facilitated the forward presence of 
the U.S. armed forces in Asia-Pacific through activities such as port calls, repair, joint training 
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and logistical support.166 Ultimately, the financial and economic crisis has revealed that 
Southeast Asia’s economic, political and military-strategic dependence from the U.S. and its 
strategic engagement in the region has increased rather than declined as a result of the multi-
ple crises affecting the region.  
 
6. Conclusions and Perspectives 
While ASEAN has been enormously successful in developing informal approaches toward 
cooperation and in avoiding conflicts, it has undoubedtly increased its political and economic 
leverage over the last ten years due to its remarkable economic growth and its increasing intra-
political and economic cooperation, despite the inherent diversity of ASEAN. Nonetheless, 
external factors will also in the future considerably influence the stability and future prosperity 
of the ASEAN-states. In this light, the political leverage of ASEAN for maintaing a peaceful 
change within its countries as well as within the entire region depends also on stable and 
peaceful relations within the triangular relationship of the United States, China and Japan.  
Despite some sympathy for China in facing U.S. pressure, ASEAN has always been care-
ful to side openly with China in the demand for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from East Asia. It 
agrees with China’s call for a multipolar world, but for different reasons. Characteristically for 
the ambivalent relationship to China, several ASEAN countries have in recent years held joint 
exercises with the United States and allow the U.S.-7th Fleet to use repair and other facilities. 
Bilateral defence arrangements of some ASEAN countries with outside Western powers such 
as Britain, Australia and the United States have recently been strengthened because of Bei-
jing’s irredentist and expansionst tendencies that have resulted in an increasingly perceived 
Chinese hegemony in the ASEAN countries. However, each ASEAN state has a differrent 
attitude towards China’s attempts to acquire a dominant or even a hegemonic position in East 
Asia. Moreover, as important as ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” policy towards China 
might be, the development of Beijing’s policies in the region depend primarily on the evolu-
tion of Chinese domestic politics on which China’s neighbors have little or no direct influ-
ence. 
The strategic value of the South China Sea arisis for all neighboring countries not only 
from assumed rich ressources like oil, gas, minerals and fisheries but equally from the open 
and free movement of the major international shipping lanes in the South China Sea which are 
particularly essential for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Nearly a quarter of the 
world’s ocean freight and over half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity passes through the 
South China Sea and the major Southeast Asian bottlenecks such as the Straits of Malacca, 
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Sunda, and Lombok.167 The signing of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the spectacular economic growth and regional trade have reinforced the im-
portance of the archipelagic sea-lanes in East Asia. The Malacca Strait, the alternative Sunda 
and
 Lombok passageways and the sea-lanes around the Spratly islands are now recognised as 
being one of the most critical bottlenecks, which are of vital security concern to virtually all 
states in South- and Northeast Asia. Any unilateral control of the maritime area and the major 
shipping lanes or any mining of those maritime bottlenecks168 have widespread economic and 
military implications, as was the case during World War II when Japan used the Spratly is-
lands as a military springboard for the invasion of the Philippines, Malaysia (formerly Ma-
laya) and Indonesia (at that time, Dutch East Indies). The only real political solution seems to 
be a joint development of the potential oil and gas deposits. Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Australia, Japan and South Korea have already chosen this approach for their mu-
tual benefit. China as the main player and perceived potential hegemon, however, has so far 
not offered really the willingness for a joint development of disputed areas in the South China 
Sea despite all verbal assurances for a peaceful settlement of disputes. Beijing’s willingness 
for a joint development remains dependent on the acceptance of China’s sovereignty over the 
Spratly islands and almost the entire South China Sea as Chinese “internal waters”. 
Whilst China is perceived by all ASEAN countries – but to a different extent – as the main 
potential long-term threat to regional stability, Japan is perceived much more positively, as 
long as Tokyo does not totally dominate their economies and accepts them as equal partners, 
as well as limiting its military role to participation in multilateral manoeuvres in Southeast 
Asia. While the Chinese role and power is certainly growing and ASEAN sometimes uses 
Japan as a countervailing power to China’s military might, Japan itself is eager to enhance 
cooperation and dialogue with ASEAN. The polite but cautious response to the “Hashimoto-
doctrine” in the ASEAN-countries in 1997, however, has indicated that an enlarged Japanese 
leadership role in Asia seems to come primarily from within – thereby encouraged by the 
United States – rather than from the Asian neighbors. Given Japan’s domestic and external 
constraints assuming such a greater role in regional security affairs, Japan’s political options 
as a “constraint power” in dealing with volatile and politically charged challenges are still 
limited by a combination of domestic and external factors. In this light, Japan’s government 
needs a strong political will to take over new security obligations and to initiate a broader and 
open security debate with the public in order to bolster new directions of its foreign and secu-
rity policy. Like ASEAN’s relations with China, the relationship and attitude of ASEAN’s 
member states vis-à-vis Japan differ to some extent, including the question whether and to 
which extent Tokyo should shoulder more regional and international obligations in the field of 
security. Although there is a recognition within ASEAN of Japan’s important contribution to 
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the region’s economic growth and political stability, there remain ambivalent views of a larger 
Japanese political and security role.  
Given the lasting mistrust of the Asian neighbors towards Japan due to historical senti-
ments and fears that might complicate ASEAN’s relations with China, Tokyo can only assume 
a greater regional security role in a close security alliance with Washington that reassures the 
other East Asian states. Taking these circumstances into account, Japan’s role will only in-
crease and evolve gradually and incrementally. Nonetheless, Japanese experts have indicated 
that possible future security assistance might include supplying ASEAN states with military 
equipment and technologies, education and training of military personnel as well as develop-
ing close bi- and multi-lateral security consultations169 (although these kinds of security assis-
tance are not all totally new). 
Against this background, and given China’s suspicion of the redefined U.S.-Japanese Se-
curity Alliance, the United States and Japan need to demonstrate that the aim of their alliance 
is the preservation of regional peace and stability rather than the containment of China. In this 
regard, and considering Japan’s repeated efforts to involve China in a closer bi- and multilat-
eral security dialogue, ASEAN can play a useful role in reassuring China that the re-definition 
of the U.S.-Japanese security is in the interest of the entire region and not specifically directed 
against China. Beijing, in turn, has to recognise that disputes with Taiwan are only an internal 
matter as long as the bilateral conflict does not become violent and affect the security interests 
of other neighboring countries in East Asia. 
Ultimately, however, the stability of the region will in future depend on a strong and sus-
tained engagement policy by the United States, encompassing substantial political, economic 
and military means and stability in the strategic triangle during historic times when China, 
Japan and the United States are all strong Asian powers at the same time. Therefore, the ques-
tion of China’s future domestic stability and the direction of its foreign policies, as well as of 
the political coherence within ASEAN itself (particularly after the admission of its new mem-
bers Laos and Myanmar to ASEAN-9), will largely determine the extent of ASEAN’s ability 
to raise its voice in the region and on at global level. The more China follows an assertive or 
even aggressive policy, such as it has done in the South China Sea, the more ASEAN’s rela-
tions with the other outside powers, namely to the United States and Japan, will once again 
become important. Those strategic trends in the wake of the financial and economic crisis that 
has been sweeping through East Asia since the summer of 1997 can already be identified. And 
the more ASEAN becomes dependent on these two powers, the more it will ultimately hamper 
or even reduce its own independent influence in the region and beyond. In such a case (which 
cannot be dismissed simply as a worst case scenario), the responsibility of the three major 
powers might become even more important for the stability of the strategic triangle and in 
doing so the entire Asia-Pacific region. In this light, the bilateral alliances of the U.S. with its 
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allies in the Asia-Pacific region, supplemented by the multilateral security organisations of 
ARF, CSCAP and other ‘track-two’ activities, will remain the bedrock of regional stability, 
particularly during times of transition of the socio-economic and political systems and the rise 
of China with its potential unprecedented economic, political and military power in the re-
gion.170 In this context, the U.S.-Japan security alliance will remain the linchpin of ASEAN’s 
stability, Japan’s security in general and the maintenance of Japan’s, South Korea’s and Tai-
wan’s non-nuclear weapon status for the time being. 
In order to raise its political leverage towards the major powers China, Japan and the 
United States, ASEAN must deepen internal cooperation and integration. Given continued 
suspicion and distrust among some ASEAN member states that hamper shared threat percep-
tions and defining common security policies, ASEAN also needs to increase internal political 
cohesiveness by deepening the cooperation within a defence network without creating a for-
mal military alliance. By becoming a real security community, one can argue that these proc-
esses between ASEAN member states will inevitably stimulate the development of closer re-
gional defence ties beyond the existing network of bilateral defence ties in the mid- and long-
term – otherwise it will backfire on the political institutionalisation processes under way, in-
cluding the multilateral ARF and CSCAP cooperation processes. ASEAN’s continued unity 
and vitality, by keeping the United States engaged in the region, might then become the cru-
cial linchpin to the future regional and subregional stability in East Asia.  
At the same time, ASEAN needs to recognise its constrained instruments to deal with 
pressing internal and external challenges. In this light, ASEAN has to redefine the ‘Asian way’ 
and concept of “non-interference” and to move to something that Malaysia’s Deputy Prime 
Minister, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, in 1997 called “constructive interference”.171 
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